Secret ballots - how does that work?

In OpenSlides, you have the option of conducting votes or elections by name or non-name. In addition, you can also record analogue votes (by show of hands or ballot paper).

In the case of digital votes and elections, on the one hand, a clear identification of the person entitled to vote must be guaranteed, among other things, in order to avoid e.g. double votes. On the other hand, the principle of secret ballot must be guaranteed.

At the moment of non-roll-call voting, the following are therefore evaluated in the database in parallel and independently of each other:
a) whether an account has already voted
b) which vote(s) are cast, i.e. what was voted for/against.

Thus, there is no assignable list with names and votes. Direct traceability of electronic voting in OpenSlides is therefore not possible, neither via the OpenSlides web interface nor by direct access to the database, and complies with security requirements. It is also not possible to establish an allocation retrospectively.

However, electronic votes always leave a minimal digital trace (IP address and other metadata). For data protection reasons, we expressly refrain from storing IP addresses in our hosting operations.

This is explicitly stated in our contract for order processing and the Technical Organisational Measures (TOM).

OpenSlides is therefore suitable for conducting secret ("non-nominal") elections and votes.

Further notes

As a confidence-building measure and to increase the transparency of the system, we recommend holding a "roll call" test election at the beginning of an event and then anonymising it afterwards as a trial.

As a further step towards even more anonymity, it is possible to give delegates pseudonymous access to the system in parallel. These accesses are then assigned to the delegates, usually under notarial supervision. At the corresponding agenda item, the delegates would be asked to log in with their assigned and pseudonymous accesses and cast their vote.
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